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Abstract 
 
After the Cold War the nature and character of international conflict has changed 
dramatically, from traditional inter-state conflicts to protracted social conflicts.  
This constitutes a major challenge to contemporary peacebuilders, foremost the UN, 
but the expanding size and number of peacekeeping missions are threatening to 
erode UN resources. Peacebuilding scholars have different views on what actually 
denotes the concept, but the need for a more holistic approach has been emphasised, 
which requires short-medium- and long-term engagement in different activities.  
     Democracy, good governance, and economic development have replaced the old, 
Cold War- notions of conflict resolution, which entailed mainly security and 
military priorities. In that sense, it is natural that the first post-modern political 
entity, the European Union, has come up with the ambition and aspiration to 
intervene in conflicts and crises around the world, and to contribute to 
peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are many challenges and risks involved in that 
endeavour, and the institutional basis of the EU may not yet be sufficient in terms 
of dealing with short-term crisis responses and the medium- to long-term tasks in 
conflict zones.  
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1. Preface 
 
 
The challenge of rebuilding societies torn apart by war remains to this day an 
immense challenge to the international community, not least showed by the 
contemporary, ostensibly unsolvable conflicts in for example Sudan, the Middle 
East and Sri Lanka, to name but a few.  
     Following the end of the Cold War, the nature and character of international 
conflict has changed dramatically, from the traditional inter-state conflicts over 
boundaries and territory (Zartman & Rasmussen 2003:3-5;26) to protracted social 
conflicts: “intense struggles between rival groupings…motivated by non-
ideological factors” (Hampson 1996:4). Civil war, often arising from interethnic 
conflict, has replaced the classic interstate war and, thus, has contributed to the 
increasing complexity of present-day peacebuilding (Jeong 2005:2); between 1989 
and 1994, the world saw 94 armed conflicts, of which only four were considered 
traditional interstate conflicts. Consequently, the size and number of United 
Nation’s peacekeeping missions have expanded considerably since 1989, stretching 
out and eroding UN resources as a result (Zartman & Rasmussen 2003:38).  
      This new kind of war, Bellamy (2005) argues, “reflects the ongoing erosion of 
state’s monopoly on legitimate, organized warfare”, which he attributes to 
contemporary globalization processes (Bellamy et al. 2005:3). According to 
Bellamy, globalization has transformed the former Westphalian society of states - 
based on the notion of non-intervention in sovereign states unless a conflict therein 
threatens international order - into a post-Westphalian conception of the world order 
that rests on the idea of “the democratic peace” (:2). This new concept assumes that 
the way a certain state acts in the international community is “inextricably 
connected to the nature of its domestic society” (ibid.). Liberal relations between 
states require democratic societies within states, and, consequently, the role of post-
Westphalian peacebuilding is not restricted to ensure order and peace between 
states, but also to ensure peace within them (ibid.).   
     Some scholars have noticed an emerging consensus around the view of 
peacebuilding as a long-term engagement that requires wider, more concerted and 
coherent efforts, in order to achieve a lasting impact and to “overcome the scars and 
complex legacies of war” (Berdal 1996:5-6). Berdal, for one, emphasizes the 
importance of long-term commitment and sustained effort to “overcome the legacy 
of violence” and asserts that “lasting success…depends largely on the extent in 
which short-term concerns about security and stability [are] reconciled with long-
term strategies…” (:8)  
     Drawing from contemporary peacebuilding and conflict management literature, 
a view emerges which emphasises an apparent need for a more “holistic approach”, 
which goes beyond security and military priorities to tackle specific issues of 
democratic legitimacy and governance (Cousens & Kumar et al. 2001:1); this has 
been discussed by Jeong (2005) in an attempt to give a “clear, policy-relevant 
conceptualization of a peacebuilding process” (Jeong 2005:19). According to Jeong 
it is essential to obtain a “clear understanding of the diverse dimensions of 
peacebuilding” and the various strategies required to achieve the goal of sustainable 
peace (ibid.). Identifying and coming to terms with root causes of war and conflict, 
such as ethnic and religious hostilities, is arguably the method of resolving 
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protracted interstate conflicts, according to a large faction of peacebuilding 
scholars.   
Along with the call for a new approach on peacebuilding, the last decade has seen 
an increasing reliance on established international or regional organizations to 
devise and conduct a UN mandate “in conjunction with the security council” 
(Bellamy et al. 2005:183). According to Bellamy, this is a practical way of closing 
the “mandate-means gap and fosters greater vertical and horizontal co-operation” 
(ibid.). Indeed an increasing number of non-state actors are playing significant roles 
due to globalization processes, not least the European Union (:189). Zartman and 
Rasmussen (2003) would also like to see a global system which provides for “new 
actors” in peacebuilding, and, albeit neglecting the role of the EU, recognize that 
the “complexity of the international environment is such that states [themselves] 
can no longer facilitate the pursuit of all human interest” (Zartman & Rasmussen 
2003:142). Founded from the very start as a project of peace and by many portrayed 
as the first truly post-modern political phenomenon (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:1), 
the European Union (EU) is an entity among whose important aims are: Promotion 
of human rights; the promotion of democracy and good governance; and the 
prevention of violent conflicts (Smith 2004:152-3). The failures of former 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo, some critics argue, demonstrated to the world that the 
Union was not and will perhaps never be, ready to manage violent conflicts and 
achieve peace in troubled countries. Since then, however, the EU has constantly 
strived to achieve a “more coherent and integrated approach” (Nowak, 2006:11) in 
order to obtain the different instruments and capacities necessary for assisting in 
building peace in war-torn countries (ibid.).  
     The questions that needs to be addressed, however, is whether the Union has the 
appropriate institutional framework necessary for demanding endeavours such as 
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the essential 
effective decision-making and policy implementation machinery.  
      
 
1.1 Statement of Purpose  
 
  
The purpose and aim of this study is to relate scholar’s ideas on effective 
peacebuilding in conflict-ridden societies to the efforts of the EU to create the 
capacity “to act in a coherent and above all effective manner over the whole of its 
international environment” (Gnesotto et al. 2004:5).  
     Furthermore, this study discusses and problematizes the EU as a peacebuilder 
through a two-level approach: the Union in general within the broader context of 
general peacebuilding and as an international actor; and, more specifically, a case 
study analyzing the EU’s activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On the 
more general level, this thesis will discuss and problematize the European Union’s 
increasing significance in peacebuilding operations, bearing in mind the its 
ambition “to develop…all the instruments necessary for defusing crises” (ibid.).  
According to the Union’s foreign policy chief, the EU High Representative Javier 
Solana, “[the Union has] developed these instruments, defined capabilities, 
undertaken to achieve the goals we set out for ourselves”, and the result has been 
“successful, collective action” (ibid.).  
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The purpose of the case study is to assess what the Union, to this day, has 
accomplished in the DRC, in order to discuss the EU’s strengths and weaknesses. 
By surveying the Union’s efforts at building peace and assisting the transition to 
democracy in the DRC, this thesis intends to examine the level of coherence of the 
EU’s peacebuilding efforts, since coherence by many peacebuilding scholars is 
considered a prerequisite for a successful operation.  
     Moreover, this study aims to investigate whether the EU actually fulfils what the 
peacebuilding literature deem necessary for a modern-day peacebuilder. 
Consequently, that implies accounting for advantages and disadvantages and 
plausible impediments of the Union as a peacebuilder, for example the level of 
coherence when twenty-seven EU-countries are to conduct concerted peacebuilding 
operations collectively. In that respect, it is necessary to study the Union from an 
institutional perspective, drawing on the belief that institutions do matter when 
studying EU decision-making and policy implementation.  
 
The following specific questions delimit the general scope of the inquiry:  
 
 
- Does the EU fulfil the requirements of a peacebuilder, in line with Jeong’s and     
other prominent scholar’s peacebuilding notions? What are the Union’s 
strength and weaknesses in that respect?  
  
-     Studying the EU operations and activities in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, what have the EU operation accomplished, in view of its main 
objectives and aims in the area? How coordinated, coherent and concerted 
have the EU’s efforts been?  
 
 
1.2 Limitations and Disposition  
 
 
Any scientific work is subject to limitations of some form, be it the amount of time 
or space or any other line of demarcation which has to be drawn somewhere. 
Naturally, this study is itself no exception to the rule. Time and space is the main 
limit setter, and the reason why I have chosen only one case study, which focuses 
on the EU peacebuilding activities in the DRC. The paper is divided into three 
sections that consider different aspects in a comprehensive approach, each of which 
aims to provide a holistic and inclusive analysis of the issues at hand.  
     The study starts with an introduction and analysis of the theory on 
peacebuilding, and a definition and conceptualization of the term; this in order to 
bring some clarity to the ongoing debate over the essence and actual purpose of 
peacebuilding.  
     The second part of the thesis portrays the EU’s decision-making and policy 
implementation from an institutional perspective, presents an introduction to the 
Union’s role in global affairs, and analyzes its institutional backbone by depicting 
the two pillars foremost concerned with EU foreign policy. By examining the 
decision-making process as well as the process of actual action- taking, the second 
part tries to scrutinize the Union’s possibilities and capacities for conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding.  
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The third part empirically examines the EU’s past and ongoing commitment in the 
DRC, in order to assess the Union’s achievements and work in the area.  
     Finally, the concluding chapter revises the arguments made in the paper, 
summarizes what the analysis has accomplished, and discusses the results.  
 
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
 
The purpose of this study is twofold and is composed of a text-analysis and a case 
study. The nature of the research method is contextually wide, and the approach can 
be described as theory consuming, since the theories used serve to describe and 
explain; as will show, this applies for both parts of the study. “The difference 
between theory-consumption and theory-testing”, Esaiasson argues, “is primarily 
found in the very purpose of the study” (Esaiasson 2004:41). Naturally, it is 
difficult to ‘test’ theories of peacebuilding and EU foreign policy and, therefore, 
this study is not an attempt to test or develop theories; rather, it is an attempt to 
present a plausible explanation of reality in order to understand and describe.  
Because of the chosen research design, the aim of the study has more of an 
‘idiographic’ rather than ‘nomothetic’ character, i.e. the results produced will not 
provide a basis for further generalizations, even though some evaluations will be 
made, possibly with the hope that future scholars of the subject will have further use 
of the study. The applied research-methods will be outlined more thoroughly below.  
 
 
1.3.1 Text-Analysis  
 
 
The first and second parts are based on the text-analysis method, which aims to 
examine two kinds of theoretical and empirical literature: first, ‘post-modern’ 
peacebuilding in general, i.e. the ideas on peacebuilding put forward by scholars 
such as Jeong, Hampson and prominent others; and second, theoretical literature 
concerning the common foreign policy of the European Union, its institutional 
basis, organisation and degree of responsibility regarding peacebuilding activities.  
     The first part, thus, is a thorough investigation of theoretical and empirical 
literature on peacebuilding, outlining the structure of the term and its conceptual 
framework; and literature on the EU as an international actor, peacebuilder and its 
institutional and organizational capabilities. How, then, does the text analyst 
suitably advance his conclusions? It is certainly possible to assert that one has 
reached plausible results; the question is how to affirm the viewpoint convincingly 
and in an unambiguous manner (Esaiasson 2004:249). Unlike the quantitative 
scholar’s method, there are no straightforward facts or numbers to establish; the 
qualitative scholar must then do with other means, i.e. to rely on other empirical 
evidence to support the conclusion. Sometimes the task is an easy one, as the core 
of the result lies in the accumulated outcome, and, consequently, it is difficult to 
point to any individually tangible result (ibid.).  
     Drawing from contemporary peacebuilding literature, the aim is to conceptualize 
what actually delineates peacebuilding in the 21st century.  
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Studying contemporary EU literature, the purpose is to examine what scholars 
consider as strengths and weaknesses regarding the Union as a peacebuilder. The 
purpose is then to weigh and measure the institutional and organizational 
advantages and impediments of the EU to the list of criteria of post-modern 
peacebuilding and its conceptual framework.  
     The chosen approach is intended to survey the general theories required to 
answer the specific questions of this thesis: if the EU fulfils the requirements of a 
“post-modern” peacebuilder, and, on a theoretical level, to discuss and assess the 
Union’s plausible advantages and shortcomings.  
     To recapitulate, the first part of this study can be described as a qualitative text 
analysis. This research method is quiet common in the field of social sciences; it 
may be accurate to describe it as one of the “core practices” of social science 
(Esaiasson et al. 2004:233). In a wider sense, all scholars who relate their research 
to earlier efforts employ this technique. An essential feature in this method is to 
bring out the significant content through a meticulous reading of the text’s parts, 
this in order to capture the essence of the text, i.e. the central elements, and to 
arrange and critically examine the content (ibid.).  
     In a sense, the list of criteria can pass for normative as it is to contain what 
actions and efforts are considered necessary and right in order to achieve peace. It 
can be argued, however, that it may often be precisely norms and principles that 
govern countries and international organizations in their peacebuilding efforts. 
These norms and principles, often viewed as ‘universal’, may be incongruent and 
inconsistent with the recipient country’s norms: “Imposing Western- sourced 
international norms”, Pugh argues, “is a dubious enterprise since they may be 
irrelevant and the imposition resisted” (Pugh 2000:6). Nevertheless, it is the present 
author’s view that it is not feasible to exclude normative statements in 
peacebuilding theories and ideas. It should be added, moreover, that the list of 
criteria is also experience based - i.e. based on the actions and tools found wanting- 
that is, shortcomings which scholars have perceived.  
 
 
1.3.2 Case Study   
 
 
The second part of the study consists of an empirical, qualitative case study of EU 
peacebuilding activities in the DRC, with the aim of evaluating what the EU has 
accomplished there to this day, considering the restrictions imposed by the UN-
mandate, its main objectives, and aims in the area. The case study will focus on 
arguably essential elements of peacebuilding activities, such as coherence, 
organization and coordination. The empirical results generated from the study will 
then serve to examine, or perhaps underline, the discrepancies between theory and 
fieldwork. Thus, a further aim is to compare the results from the empirical case 
study with the literature on EU foreign policy and peacebuilding efforts, which 
analyzes EU strengths and weaknesses. However, one must stress the complications 
and challenges involved in assessing the impact of ongoing operations.  
     According to Yin (1984), the advantages of using a case study as a research 
strategy is that it allows for an investigation to maintain “the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 1984:14), i.e. organizational and 
managerial processes and international relations (ibid.). When “how” and “why” 
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questions are being posed, and when the focal point of the study is on a present-day 
event, case study is the preferred strategy; furthermore, the flexibility of the 
research method is such that case studies can be both exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. Another of the advantages of case study as a research method, Yin 
argues, is its ability to deal with a broad variety of evidence, for example 
documents, interviews and empirical observations (:20).  
 
 
1.4 Material 
 
 
As regards the chosen material for this study, this comprises of both primary and 
secondary sources. The difference between the two kinds of material concerns 
mainly the ability to confirm stories, i.e. the credibility and authenticity of a certain 
document or paper. Primary sources are more credible than secondary, due to the 
simple fact that accounts and claims from people who have in fact been involved in 
events are easier to believe than accounts from people who merely recapitulate what 
others have said (Esaiasson et al. 2004:309).  
     The main bulk, however, consists of secondary sources, empirical and 
theoretical, concerning peacebuilding; the organizational and institutional aspects of 
EU foreign policy; EU operations in the DRC; the DRC; and methodological 
literature. At a first glance, the selection of literature on peacebuilding may appear 
somewhat biased in one direction, from a theoretical point of view, but it is the 
author’s view that defining and delineating peacebuilding in the 21st century 
implies accounting for views of scholars who are essentially ‘post-modern’ in their 
perspectives. Consequently, that involves taking into account the impact of 
globalization, the changing character of international conflict and embracing the 
post-Westphalian conception of the world order. With that in mind, there are, 
however, competing definitions of peacebuilding which mainly concerns the 
activities and tools of the concept.  
     Concerning the EU material, the literature have been selected out of a wide 
range of sources, written by scholars with different theoretical approaches on the 
subject of the EU as an international actor, peacebuilder, and its institutional and 
organizational capabilities to act coherently and collectively, to name but the key 
points. Therefore, it is the author’s opinion that the literature, in that respect, cannot 
be characterised as biased in any form.  
     The primary material consists mainly of reports and works from NGO’s and 
think tanks who have studied and monitored the EU’s operation in the DRC; and 
reports and materials from the European Commission and other EU institutions.  
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2. Peacebuilding 
 
2.1 Introduction      
 
 
“The term peacebuilding refers to all the efforts required on the way to the creation 
of a sustainable peace zone” (Reychler & Paffenholz et al. 2001:12). Thus describes 
Reychler the art of peacebuilding, as a way of transforming a conflict by addressing 
all the major components of it. Through peacebuilding, Reychler argues, the 
conflict is not only resolved, it shifts entirely (ibid.); “it tries to make the world safe 
for conflicts” (ibid.).  
     Conflicts are signals that problems need to be taken care of, and if conflicts are 
not resolved effectively, they may become destructive and cause enormous 
suffering; there are today over 200 places in the world “where people kill people” 
(ibid.). Naturally, conflict leads to physical destruction and human suffering, but it 
“is also a strong motivation force for peacebuilding” (Reychler & Paffenholz, ed. 
2001:3). The term peacebuilding at first surfaced in former Secretary General 
Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace from 1992, wherein the intention was to map 
the full range of postwar needs of a certain country and to identify the international 
resources available to meet those (Cousens & Kumar et al. 2001:5). Peacebuilding 
thus supposedly takes place after a conflict has finished and the parties have agreed 
a political settlement, i.e. a settlement “written and enforced by the international 
society” (Bellamy et al. 2005:236). This approach viewed conflict as “linear”, 
which implied that peacebuilding was necessary first after the three initial steps of 
preventive diplomacy and prevention had failed, and after traditional peacekeeping 
(if it has occurred) and after peacemaking had paved the way by restoring at least 
some measure of order in the inflicted country (Mason & Meernik 2006:109).      
Peacebuilding was, according to Boutros-Ghali, to take place after these activities 
and encompassed a wide range of specific tasks, from disarming the warring parties 
and demobilizing troops to much broader and “less tangible objectives”, such as 
fostering democratic institutions, promoting human rights (Cousens & Kumar et al. 
2001:6-7) as well as efforts which aimed at altering a “cultural affinity for resolving 
conflicts with weapons” (Jeong 2005:22).  
     At odds with theory, as is not uncommon, peacebuilding may not be a linear 
process and may not always go as planned, but according to Jeong it needs to be 
“goal-oriented process” (:19). There is always a danger of incoherence, because of 
multiple actors pursuing different goals lacking consensus on the long-term vision 
of peace (ibid.).  
     An effective implementation of peacebuilding policies entails a “compelling 
definition of peace”, in that the long-term goal of peacebuilding not only lies in 
restoring order and reducing suffering, but also in achieving self-sufficiency. Simply 
providing order is not sufficient if the long-term goals are to accomplish sustainable 
peace (:21). The general aim of peacebuilding is to construct an environment of 
sustainable peace, i.e. the absence of armed violence; the absence of structural, 
psychological and cultural discrimination; a constructive transformation of 
conflicts; and both external and internal legitimacy (:92).  
     The concept of peacebuilding involves the assumption that external actors can 
exercise both the power and the moral authority to achieve peaceful change, which 
the local actors evidently have not succeeded in doing. When international 
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diplomacy has failed to avert a violent conflict, then, presumably, external actors 
are to make concerted efforts to “pick up the pieces and regenerate societies” (Pugh 
2000:3) to prevent further violence. Assumptions alone, Pugh argues, are not 
enough, however, if external actors are to bring about peaceful change (ibid.). Like 
Jeong, Pugh criticizes “hard” and inflexible peacebuilding projects, which are 
seemingly more concerned with integrating war-torn countries in the world 
economy than with addressing the root problems (:6).  
 
 
2.2 Explaining the Development of Peacebuilding 
 
 
The origins of peacebuilding can be found in the changing political environment 
after the Cold War, which has altered the way war is waged, coined as ‘new wars’ 
(Bellamy et al. 2005:3). The ending of the Cold War, Mason & Meernik argue, 
meant a dramatic increase in the number of peacebuilding operations due to the 
greater will of the permanent Security Council members to let the UN conduct and 
handle peace operations; the “stalemate” in the Council was broken (Mason & 
Meernik 2006:125). The wars of the post- Cold War era and, consequently, the 
threats to international peace and security, are civil wars and failed states, which 
have greatly increased the demand for peacebuilding operations (ibid.). The human 
catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia as well as numerous failed peace 
settlements were ascribed to those rather ‘new’ phenomenons in the international 
community (Bellamy et al. 2005:3;75). These ‘new wars’ were something notably 
different from earlier wars, which were mainly fought between states rather than 
within them; the complexity of these new conflicts and the difficulties the 
peacebuilders faced prompted a serious reconsideration of efforts, tools and overall 
planning (ibid.). The conditions that generated civil wars, and those that resulted 
from them, incited a new holistic approach that was to address a wider range of 
issues, such as democratic governance, legitimacy, economic equity and social 
inclusion that could thwart war-torn countries from plunging into violence yet again 
(Cousens & Kumar et al 2001:1). 
     The normative issue is also important for explaining the emergence of 
peacebuilding, which Bellamy attributes to a “qualitative transformation” on part of 
the UN of the way conflicts are evaded: The responsibilities of peacekeepers had to 
be broadened to include promoting liberal-democratic peace (Bellamy et al. 
2005:75). Peacebuilding, one might say, was born out of that notion. The 
challenges of civil wars was an argument for prolonging the timeframe of 
international operations and assistance, because even if peace could be forcedly 
kept for a couple of years after the peace-settlement, it was not likely to “stabilize” 
and “deepen”, that is, become something more than a short respite and a breather 
for the suffering population (Cousens & Kumar et al 2001:2). Liberalism, Mason & 
Meernik argue, is in fact “the guiding force behind peacebuilding operations” 
(Mason & Meernik:126), which implies the promotion of democracy and market 
economy with the goal of transforming states to become productive, peaceful 
members of the international community (ibid.). Globalization, other scholars 
argue, may also serve as an explanation for the rise of peacebuilding. Bellamy 
asserts that globalization processes have altered the way states behave in the 
international community. According to Bellamy, globalization has transformed the 
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former Westphalian society of states - based on the notion of non-intervention in 
sovereign states unless a conflict therein threatens international order - into a post-
Westphalian conception of the world order that rests on the idea of “the democratic 
peace” (Bellamy et al.:2).  
     Globalization, others argue, has also increased the media’s coverage of conflicts 
and suffering in other countries, and thus augmented public pressure for 
intervention and action (Mason & Meernik:126-7). In a way, one might view 
globalization and liberalism as interrelated explanations of the development of 
peacebuilding; a consensus has evolved on the ascendancy of liberalism after the 
Cold War and “is consistent with the notion of peacebuilding as a set of activities 
for peaceful conflict management” (:126).  
 
 
2.3 Defining Peacebuilding: Competing Views 
 
 
Scholars have different assumptions on the definition of peacebuilding, and it has 
been defined in various ways (Mason & Meernik 2006:55) 
     Given the difficulties, the differing characteristics and the special circumstances 
of various conflicts, and the varying means by which the peace is pursued, it is 
obvious that not all operations will look alike (Mason & Meernik 2006:4), nor be 
considered success-stories. Rather, the question of what actually determines 
successful peacebuilding efforts is critical: History reveals some noteworthy 
achievements, but also some striking failures (Hampson 1996:6).  
     The challenges of peacebuilding cannot be taken lightly. Indeed, getting the 
warring parties to the negotiating table can be a grand achievement; an even greater 
challenge, however, is to have both parts to abide by the agreements and mutual 
commitments implicated in the settlement. Here the peacebuilding process can 
break down “like sand castles in quicksand” (Hampson 1996:5).   
     Drawing on different views, Galtung (in Bellamy et al. 2005:234) views 
peacebuilding as “the practical implementation of social change through socio-
economic reconstruction and development” (Bellamy et al. 2005, ibid.); Ryan 
argues for peacebuilders to concern themselves with changing the “belligerent and 
antagonistic attitudes that foster violent conflict at the grassroots level” (ibid.); 
Lederach stresses the importance of “maintaining a broad conception of conflict and 
peacebuilding” (ibid.); and according to Miall, peacebuilding is the work of 
underpinning peacemaking and peacekeeping by “addressing structural issues and 
long-term relationships between conflictants” (ibid.). Considering these ostensibly 
incongruent views, the differences, nonetheless, seem to lie more at the ‘micro’ 
rather than at the ‘macro’ level; that is, a degree of consensus seem to exist on the 
general features of peacebuilding, albeit the methods, tools and efforts differ. Most 
scholars of peacebuilding emphasise the need for concerted efforts, long-term 
commitment, a coherent peace-plan, an overall needs assessment and, what is vital, 
an effective implementation of the plan (Bellamy et al. 2005:3;75).  
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2.4 In Search of a Conceptualization: Towards a Consensus  
 
 
Having analyzed a broad range of peacebuilding literature, one might have to agree 
with Mason and Meernik in acknowledging the improbability of a “single, 
universally agreed-upon definition of peacebuilding” (Mason & Meernik 
2006:108). However, some intersubjective consensus does exist on the dimensions 
of peacebuilding: Most scholars agree with Boutros Ghali’s notion that the goal of 
peacebuilding is to “prevent the recurrence of conflict” (ibid.).  
     Research on peacebuilding has focused more on the assessments of practical 
experiences and case studies than on bridging the theoretical gaps. Thus, the results 
obtained has fortified contradictory views, rather than contributed to what Jeong 
calls an “integrative peacebuilding model” (Jeong 2005:14). To conceptualize 
peacebuilding and integrate the main themes, one must recognize the uniqueness of 
every conflict, i.e. the special conditions that distinguish certain countries. Although 
the vision of peacebuilding and the paths to peace may be multiple, “a clear policy-
relevant conceptualization of a peacebuilding process is necessary” (:19). In Jeong’s 
opinion, peacebuilding is not about writing a checklist of tasks; rather, he suggests a 
synergetic approach in order for a more concerted strategy (ibid.). Supporting that 
notion, Pugh argues that the instruments, solutions and planning employed during 
the Cold War are no longer sufficient: The conflicts of today are not purely military 
in nature (if they ever have been), and, hence, nor will military solutions alone 
suffice to build peace. The international community has recognized that protracted 
conflicts bear with them terrible human costs, and that, owing to a re-
conceptualization of security, conflicts may lead to security implications for states, 
not least problems with large masses of refugees (Pugh 2000:15-16). Pugh would 
also like to see a “clear, policy-relevant conceptualization of the term” 
peacebuilding (:16). The means by which peace is pursued is not, however, the 
most important issue, Mason and Meernik argue, because these means will differ 
from nation to nation depending on the type of conflict fought. Yet, all operations 
have a common goal, as Rasmussen (in Mason & Meernik 2006:4) writes:  
 
Peacebuilding, whether in the post conflict resolution phase or as efforts to prevent the 
eruption of nascent conflict, depends on the ability to transform the conflict situation 
from one of potential or actual mass violence to one of co-operative, peaceful 
relationships capable of fostering reconciliation, reconstruction, and long-term 
economic and social development (Mason & Meernik 2006:4).  
 
Thus, specific goals of peacebuilding are only “means to a greater end” (Mason & 
Meernik 2006:4); if the actions taken produce peace, then the efforts can be judged 
as a success (ibid.). It should be added that peacebuilding as such should not be 
confused with regular, longer-term development programmes conducted by NGOs 
and other organizations; as Pugh argues, “the root causes of violence are in fact 
apolitical issues” (Pugh 2000:18), for example poverty, resource scarcity and 
unemployment. Peacebuilding should also not be restricted to or defined by a 
specific phase of a conflict, such as post-conflict - rather, as the UN Department of 
Political Affairs concludes, peacebuilding have to be understood as a “continuum of 
activities which may be present in all phases of conflict” (:17-18).  
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
 
The above reading has attempted to conceptualize the broad and multifaceted theory 
of peacebuilding, considering the vague, elusive and perhaps even abstract nature of 
the concept. It is difficult to point out certain features that are ‘mandatory’, and to 
agree around a set of principles that are essential for a successful peacebuilding 
mission. What is certain, however, is that peacebuilding is a long-term engagement, 
but that it also consists of various tools and actions according to timeframe. 
Boutros-Ghali’s notion that peacebuilding is to commence after the conflict, is 
erroneous, however, as building peace should not be confined to a certain phase of 
the conflict. Focusing on root causes is an essential part, as these must be addressed 
if the conflict is to be solved: Peacebuilders must be attentive to the long-term 
economic and socio-political development, and acknowledge that fostering peaceful 
relationships and reconciliation is an ongoing commitment. However, perhaps most 
important of all, the peacebuilders must have the political will and the funding to 
tackle the problems, a subject which the peacebuilding scholars often fail to 
appreciate. (Terrie, International Herald Tribune, 2005-01-27).  
     Scholars of peacebuilding seem to agree on the need for concerted efforts, a 
coherent peace-plan and an effective implementation of the plan. Thus, 
peacebuilding is about addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships 
between the conflicting parties. What differs is the role of ‘economic governance’, 
as some scholars argue that the liberal ideas of forcibly integrating (foremost) 
African countries into the world market do much more harm than good than 
development-oriented strategies would (Schmidt, European Voice: 2005-01-27).  
     Many peacebuilding scholars emphasise that it is deceptive to assume that the 
ending of all-out war and the signing of a peace agreement will make mistrust, 
hostilities and suspicion disappear. Disarming, demobilisation, and reintegration 
(DDR) of former militiamen and soldiers are long-term objectives that need to be 
addressed if peace is to have any chance of stabilizing; a well-planned and executed 
DDR is imperative for the commitment of officers and soldiers to the peace process.  
Berdal (1996) highlights the importance of “public-order institutions”, foremost the 
national police force which must be widely recognized and perceived as credible 
and legitimate (Berdal 1996:74); this requires external commitment in order to train 
and monitor the new force “well beyond the formal end” of a DDR mission (ibid.) 
[emphasis added]. The security sector, thus, is key for “restructuring the activities” 
of the elements which seek to destabilise and violate human rights (ibid.). 
Furthermore, a priority when reforming the security sector is to collect and control 
small arms, a necessary step to avoid renewed violence (Jeong 2005:74-75).   
     As regards development programmes and assistance, the recipient countries have 
far greater chances of success and to avoid donor-dependency if the programmes 
are designed to promote self-sufficiency and the capacities of the local economy 
(Berdal 1996:75).  
     In view of the complexities associated with peacebuilding in ‘failed states’, 
coordination is essential in order to achieve the goals agreed upon; coordination is 
also important when “assigning different roles and activities to both external and 
internal actors” (Jeong 2005:219). Alas, as history reveals, the involvement of 
various IOs and NGOs in the peacebuilding process, in diverse sectors and with 
perhaps incompatible goals, is difficult to coordinate and synchronise with the 
‘major’ actor’s activities and operations.  
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3. The EU and the World  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
The EU may very likely present a perplexing and ambiguous image to the rest of 
the world. It is more than an international organization, but less so than a state; to 
conceptualize its identity is a complex task (Bomberg & Stubb 2003:3). As 
McCormick (2005) argues, however, whereas the EC was once a political exercise 
of limited scope, it is now a “global superpower” (McCormick 2005: xii).  
     Outside actors might contemplate whether to think of the Union as a single body, 
or to conceive of it as a unit of 27 Member States (ibid.) united around a wide range 
of common interests and normative values. The complexity of the organization is 
illustrated by its multifaceted character, intricate institutional machinery and the 
range and width of its policy areas, but also of its significant international influence 
and, alas, its “frequent inability to wield it” (Peterson & Sjursen 2001:3). Former 
US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, once said that to “understand Europe 
you have to be a genius or French” (McCormick 2005:1), in a way reiterating 
Kissinger’s famous remark that “there was no focal point for contact with Europe” 
(Peterson & Sjursen 2001:41), implying that if he wanted to call Europe, whom 
should he call (:41)?  
     One possible reason for the inability of the rest of the world to comprehend and 
see through the EU, as if it were “shrouded in secrecy” (Bomberg & Stubbs 
2003:7), might be that it is an entirely new phenomenon in world politics, “the first 
truly post-modern international political form” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 1). In 
that respect, the Union can be considered to be “the most highly evolved example of 
regional integration in the world” (:25); rather than working together on a set of 
issues, the Member States of the Union have transferred significant powers to a 
supranational decision-making system and bodies of common law (ibid.).  
     The Union came into existence as a means of ensuring that conflicts such as the 
World War II would never occur again. Thus, the EU was from the very beginning 
a peace project and it is difficult to contest the notion that it is also a very 
successful one (Smith 2004:147).  
     The success of its now 50 year old integration project has bestowed international 
legitimacy and authority on the Union, and with it increasing weight and influence 
in world politics (Smith 2004:148); the EU is indeed a major player in international 
relations. However, successful integration and cooperation around  numerous policy 
areas aside, crisis situations like the civil war in Yugoslavia, Europe’s own 
backyard, underlined the EC’s (:47) inability to unite around a common foreign 
policy, thus accentuating the image of Europe as “an economic giant, political 
dwarf, and a military worm” (McCormick 2005:212). These events prompted the 
creation of common EC positions on foreign policy, and the urgent need for joint 
action to prevent violent conflicts. The EC did not possess the necessary 
institutional apparatus for such endeavours, however, which led to the creation of 
the CFSP, following the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 1993 
(:24) which entailed institutional reforms with the aim of extending cooperation 
around new policy objectives, wherein a common foreign policy was an important 
issue on the agenda (Peterson & Shackleton 2002:219).  
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3.2 The Significance of the EU’s Institutions 
 
 
An attempt at explaining the decision-and- policymaking in the EU implies 
confronting the classical question of structure versus agency. As Bomberg and 
Peterson (1999) note, the question of what determines what lead to two possible 
answers. On the one hand, given the complexity of the Union, the range and width 
of possible decision-makers, structure may very well determine the decision-
making process. “There are too many structural constraints in the EU for political 
agency to matter much often”, Bomberg and Peterson write, but they also hold for 
likely that agency in fact matters more than structure in the intricate and elusive 
structure that constitutes Union decision-making (Bomberg & Peterson 1999:31).  
     The institutionalist approach has brought new insights to the study of EU 
decision-and policymaking: The EU has a substantial degree of “institutional 
autonomy”, and so cannot be considered simply the Member States’ political 
instrument. What will be put forward and stressed later on in this paper is the level 
of institutional dependency that characterizes EU institutions: Powers are shared 
between the institutions and not so much separated between them; important 
decisions that straddle the various institutions’ ‘competencies’ require “broad 
interinstitutional agreement” (:32). As Peterson and Shackleton argue: “If 
institutions matter in determining politics in any political society, they may matter 
even more in the European Union…” (Peterson & Shackleton 2005:7). The EU’s 
institutions are important “vehicles” deployed by the Member State’s governments 
to implement the bargains struck between each other, and the Union’s institutions 
manage the “enormous interdependence” that ties together its members (ibid.) 
“They are not just cars waiting for drivers”, as Peterson and Shackleton put it 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the EU’s institutions not just act as the linkage between 
Brussels and the national capitals, they also connect the Union to the world of 
international relations, not least the wide-ranging network of IOs that now make up 
a substantial feature in international politics. In that respect the EU’s institutions are 
“powerful actors” within the international community, whose affairs until not long 
ago was completely dictated by sovereign states. The Union’s institutions cannot be 
studied separately and autonomously, bearing in mind the vast interdependence that 
exists between the various institutional frameworks (:9-11).  
     What is important to stress is the EU’s capacity for improvisation, i.e. managing 
the “internally divided institutions” despite the “lack of mechanisms for 
interinstitutional bargaining” (Bomberg & Peterson 1999:59). While the Union 
seems constructed to produce stalemate in decision-making procedures, it is 
continually “being reinvented” – lacking the advantage of any “grand design”, the 
EU still has developed a “flexible” but nonetheless “effective set of mechanisms” to 
solve difficult issues (ibid.). In short, it is the author’s view that an attempt to study 
Union decision-making without taking into account the impact of the institutional 
setting must be judged as parsimonious, if not feeble.  
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3.3 The Institutional Basis of EU Foreign Policy 
 
 
The Union’s institutional basis straddles conventional categories of political 
organization, being “less than a federation and more than a regime” (Peterson & 
Shackleton 2002:3) but not thus far a “Gemeinschaft” (ibid.). It is clearly not a state 
(:2), in view of the fact that the EU cannot levy taxes, does not (yet) command a 
common military, and does not wield sole power on behalf of the Member States, 
i.e. the ability to negotiate the full range of agreements on the Member’s account 
(Smith 2005:10-11). Ultimately, membership in the Union is voluntary, and thus the 
EU lacks the authority to force its Member States into implementing European 
policy and law (McCormick 2005:106-7). The Union  decides after a process of 
bargaining, but it is a process involving not so much the Member States, as the 
EU’s institutions: Institutional objectives are far more important than in other forms 
of government (Peterson & Bomberg 2002:29).  
     Many scholars, foremost intergovernmentalists and neo-realists, argue that the 
Union is merely a forum for intergovernmental bargaining, dominated by national 
interests, and portrayed as a means of national governments that allows them to 
escape the “domestic pressures” (Bomberg & Peterson 1999:7-8) which limit their 
manoeuvring space. That is not entirely true, however. The EU has trough the 
decades evolved into an entity sui generis, in its own right, wherein decision-
making at the EU-level is influential and powerful; power is allocated both to 
supranational levels, while many of its policy areas remain intergovernmental. 
Being largely poor in resources, still (it spends less than 2 percent of all public 
funds in the Union), the EU must raise enormous interest throughout a vast area 
comprising 459 million people (:8).  
     From an outsiders’ point of view, arguably, the EU may very well present an 
image of internal squabbling, strife and political quarrels, crippling its decision-
making. The logic of its structure gives a different picture, however, in that the 
Union is attractive to “actors interested in policy change” (:22), and because the EU 
is a “consensual system” wherein antagonism is conciliated and/or minimised; the 
actors at the Union level are dependent on each other, and need it to be functioning 
in order for action to be taken (:22-23). Thus, far from the notions of neo-realists 
and liberal intergovernmentalists, the scope of European collaboration and the 
width of European integration cannot be measured and predicted by general theories 
of statehood and sovereignty; instead, EU Member States view themselves as co-
operators, rather than competitors on the Union stage. In the area of foreign policy, 
for example, they fear more a lack of coherence and consistency than they worry 
about increasing “Europeanization” (Sweet, Sandholz & Fligsten 2001:27). The 
constant search for consensus, however, involves new problems, as it is at odds 
with the need to solve issues swiftly and effectively (Peterson & Bjursen 2001:172).  
     The institutionalization of a great many policy areas entails challenges and risks 
alike, naturally, not least illustrated by the enlargement of the EU, the EMU project, 
and the “democratic deficit” (:28), but also in the sensitive areas of defence, foreign 
policy, and security. EU foreign policy is a complicated matter, due to its complex 
institutional basis, spanning over the three pillars comprising the Union (Smith 
2005:3). The main problem of outlining and implementing EU foreign policy is not 
so much one of lack of resources or tools (:67), but more in the difficulties and 
impediments entailed in finding the political will to use the instruments coherently 
(Hill & Smith 2005:159). In the areas of security and defence, the Member States 
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have been reluctant in surrendering authority to the EU, which traditionally have 
been the domains of the nation state. Moreover, an effective implementation of the 
Union’s ambitious endeavours would require much more effective cross-pillar 
cooperation than is the case today; decision-making in the areas mentioned requires 
reaching a consensus across two or three pillars. Competition between the different 
institutions, the ‘turf-battles’, and between member states, further hampers the 
process. The question of who speaks for the EU is a justified one, and a matter of 
subject at hand, of authority and resources, i.e. which institution’s ‘competences’ 
are involved (Hill & Smith 2005:161-162). Yet the Union still manages to speak 
with one voice in world politics, but institutional adjustments, such as the much 
debated ‘Constitution for Europe’, are needed to obtain the coherence and 
efficiency that is keenly wanted (ibid.). As we shall see, a great deal of the problem 
lies in the institutional structure of the EU, in which, for example, certain policy 
domains (trade, aid and development policies) fall under the heading of 
supranational EC organizations such as the Commission and the Court. Other 
domains, involving “interaction between EC organizations and intergovernmental 
forums” (Sweet, Sandholz & Fligsten 2001:174-5) - primarily the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission- concerns matters that overlap other goals, for 
example economic aims paralleling political ones, i.e. political stability. The ‘high 
politics’ domain involves security and defence, which are clearly and inherently 
intergovernmental (:175).  
     
 
3.4 Pillar I: The European Community  
 
3.4.1 The EC Model of Policy-Making and Action 
 
 
The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (TECE), created in 1993 and 2004, respectively, were 
intended to streamline the institutional framework into a single one. The EU’s 
activities on the international scene are multiple and diverging, however, ranging 
from trade policy, environment, and humanitarian aid to peacekeeping and civilian 
crisis management (CM), reflected in a complex institutional context (Hill & Smith 
et al. 2005:68-9). The creation of the TEU entailed the formation of the European 
Union, which was both founded upon and supplementary to the European 
Community (EC). The Union established a number of political objectives, explicit 
and overarching, not least  
 
To assert its identity on the international scene, in particular trough the implementation 
of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence (Bretherton & Vogler 
1999:10).  
 
The TEU generated a new structure that comprised of three pillars, out of which the 
first, Pillar I, is the most substantial. Pillar I comprises the EC, wherein all the 
major policy areas are located, including trade, environmental policy and the main 
areas of ‘cooperation’ and ‘association’ with third parties (Bretherton & Vogler 
1999:10). The EC Pillar decision-making is largely supranational, meaning that its 
decisions and influence exceed beyond national boundaries or governments (Smith 
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2004:26) and its policies are formulated according to the Community method, 
whereby the Commission has sole right of initiative, albeit the Council of Ministers 
ultimately decides on the fate of proposed measures. The Council of Ministers is the 
principal law-making institution formally in charge of decision-making in the three 
pillars the Union comprises (Peterson & Shackleton 2002:53). The EC pillar is the 
most substantial of the three pillars, and importantly, enjoys legal personality, 
meaning that it can enter into agreements with third parties. In Pillar I, the 
Commission’s has significant influence over policy areas, and can be said to have a 
“policy entrepreneur role” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:10-11). The first pillar is by 
many scholars said to be ‘overloaded’ with work as it includes the main bulk of EU 
responsibilities. The EC operates according to the ‘Community method’, which 
assigns a major role to the institutions of the Union, as opposed to the 
‘intergovernmental method’, which depends on regular interaction between the 
Member States and Brussels; and the ‘coordination method’ which places member 
governments in charge, though “operating in a consortium” (Bomberg & Stubbs 
2003:5;154). The EC method of producing policy entails an interdependent process 
of coordination involving the Commission, the Council, the EP, and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). All of these institutions have important roles to play in 
shaping, initiating, and implementing policies; none of them stand alone or exists in 
a vacuum, and there are a multitude of links to national capitals and other IOs (:138; 
154). As the EU has emerged on the world stage as a global actor and its influence 
expanded, its foreign policy has become gradually shaped by European foreign 
policy-makers whom seek to wield Brussels as a means of advancing their own 
aims – economic or political, national or international - that may exercise a negative 
influence on the EU’s ability to act as one, with a single voice (:139).  
     Nevertheless, where powers are allocated to the EU, the decision-making 
process is quiet straightforward: the Commission initiates a proposal; the Council 
takes the final decision after thorough consultation with the other Union 
institutions; the EPs powers vary according to the policy area in question (ibid.), but 
it has the power to veto legislations which gives it significant influence (Carlsnaes; 
Sjursen & White 2004:200); and finally, the ECJ takes action to “reinforce the 
power and prerogatives of the EU institutions” (Bomberg & Stubbs 2003:139).  
   
 
3.5 Pillar II: The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
3.5.1 Coordinating Foreign Policy and Taking Action  
 
 
The second pillar of the European Union is the result of the attempts of the Member 
States to form common positions in order to conduct joint actions in the areas of 
foreign and security affairs, the CFSP. Pillar II is characterized by its largely 
intergovernmental decision-making procedure, in which, for example, the EP’s 
influence is marginal (:5). Since no single EU institution can be viewed as 
independent and free to act independently (Peterson & Shackleton 2002:350), 
however, so too is the CFSP subject to the meddling of the Commission (which 
enjoys ‘full association’ to the CFSP), and the Council which has responsibility for 
CFSP affairs. The CFSP procedures involve all the Member State’s foreign 
ministers, who play a crucial role due to the Member States’ right to influence each 
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phase of the policy-making process, this in order to ensure the conformity of 
national policies with the common positions. The CFSP, being at the same time 
intergovernmental and communitarian in its nature, is inherently a somewhat weak 
institution, largely because of the Member States’ desire to retain influence over 
crucial foreign and security issues; the notion of foreign policy as a national 
privilege and prerogative remains to this day an ingrained norm in Europe (ibid.). 
 
 
3.5.2 The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 
 
 
The EU has made crisis management and peacebuilding a distinct feature of its 
common foreign policy, with the aim of projecting the very values and norms on 
which the Union was founded upon, on IR. That implies promoting these values in 
international action, wherever needed (Gnesotto et al. 2004: 2). Peterson and 
Bomberg take a rather negative stand in this issue, asserting that in the foreign 
policy area EU “common decisions do not…produce effective action or policy” 
(Bomberg & Peterson 1999:249). They describe the problem with Union foreign 
policy as one of “lack of policy instruments” needed “to support or enforce policy 
decisions” (ibid).  
     Bretherton and Vogler argue that the scope of EU policies is indeed wide 
encompassing, covering nearly all of the important “issue areas of contemporary 
global politics, except for strictly military and strategic relations” (Bretherton & 
Vogler 1999:249) [emphasis added]. Being a necessary, if not vital, part of peace-
enforcement and peacebuilding, an ostensibly weak military capability is indeed a 
major drawback. Moreover, many scholars call for better coordination between the 
Pillars I and II, because the EU’s major muscle resides within the first pillar. The 
Union’s influence in world affairs is to a large extent predicated upon the strength 
of the Single Market, and the magnet effect of attraction which it creates and acts as 
to outside actors and countries (Hill & Smith 2005:254); streamlining the 
institutional foundations of the EU is thus critical for the success of the CFSP.        
     According to Hill (2001) the Union has “limited intervention and crisis 
management capabilities in the short term” (Hill. European Foreign Affairs Review, 
no. 6, 2001:330), but has a considerable advantage when it comes to medium term 
and, “particularly”, long-term peacebuilding (ibid. emphasis added). However, the 
successful operation in the DRC (Artemis) in 2003 provided hopes for a better 
capacity in short-term activities. It is important to stress the EU’s awareness of its 
shortcomings, its ability to learn from past mistakes, and to take steps to enhance its 
capacity through institutional measures (Hill & Smith 2005:172).  
     The EU’s concern with the long-term aspects of conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding are put into question as well. Some scholars argue that it is a liberal 
planning approach that is ill suited for the realities of civil war and humanitarian 
crises: The Union’s combination of aid, sanctions, and diplomatic links (along with 
a multitude of other measures), they argue, cannot be expected to prevent conflicts 
from breaking out again (Hill. European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001:332).  
     That critique seems unjustified, though, as it would entail criticising the concept 
of conflict prevention and peacebuilding as a whole; doing something must be 
worth more than doing nothing. Arguably, the case in point is military intervention 
being, alas, a prerequisite for a successful ending of a conflict. This capability is 
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thus a precondition for the possibility to curtail violence and, if possible, to build 
peace. Another prerequisite, Missiroli (2001) points out, is coherence, that is, to 
bring together all means and resources of the EU in order to enhance the efficiency 
of action. Explicitly, that implies improved coordination between the CFSP, the EC 
pillar, and the Member States’ activities. It might be the only direction to proceed 
in, given the absence of a specific and binding Treaty provision (Missiroli. 
European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001: 196).  
 
 
3.5.3 Critique against the CFSP  
 
 
For a European foreign policy to materialize, three different decision-making modes 
are generally employed (common strategy, common positions, and joint actions), 
involving three key Union institutions, and the foreign ministries of 27 Member 
States; thus making it difficult to reach consensus on a variety of issues, and hence, 
to actually make policy. Naturally, the EU comes of as a slow-moving decision-
maker. Jacques Delors, the former President of the European Commission, 
illustrated the point by characterizing the CFSP as “a Maserati with the engine of a 
lawn mower” (Peterson & Shackleton 2002: 217-18; 226-227).  
     For all the evident limitations (if not weaknesses) of the CFSP, it remains clear 
to the Member States that they have much to gain by acting as a group, rather than 
individually. At the same time, conversely, they fear that coordinating foreign 
policy and further integrating the cooperation in the area will impede upon the  
Member States’ freedom to act nationally; in a way, EU leaders are being “pulled in 
two directions” (McCormick et al. 2005:209). This has caused tensions that have 
served to undermine the attempts at building a common foreign policy. The 
institutional problems of the CFSP, many scholars suggest, is in part rooted in the 
flaws of the Union’s policy-making machinery, which the Treaty of Amsterdam 
was set up to cope with (:209;213) .  
     The critique against the CFSP primarily concerns the so-called capabilities-
expectations gap, i.e. the notion that the EU, though steadily increasing in influence 
and impact economically and politically in the world, still cannot live up to the 
expectations countries and organizations around the world have bestowed upon it.  
There are continuous calls for Union action in a number of diverse places: the 
Sudan, the Congolese-Rwandan border, Ukraine, East-Timor etc. Hill and Smith 
(2005) argue that the root of the problem lies in the significant difference between 
cooperating on so-called low politics issues (economic integration, trade etc) and 
the domains of high politics, which involves security and defence. Decision-making 
in this area is largely consensus-based and the role of the Commission is fairly 
limited, albeit it enjoys ‘right of association’. A consensual decision-making mode 
acts as an impediment to an effective policy-making process and may cripple it 
entirely, since even the smallest EU-member may block a decision. Hill and Smith 
affirm, however, that the Union still is an “unqualified success in the history of 
international cooperation” and that “every assessment of the EU’s performance 
should acknowledge that fact” (Hill & Smith 2005:171; 194; 403).  
     The CFSP has at least done a credible job in taking decisions on foreign policy 
issues, illustrated by the fact that not many national foreign policy decisions and 
actions are taken without consulting the CFSP, or at least referring to it(:403).     
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3.6 Conclusion  
 
 
The European process of integration was born out of the desire to rebuild the 
continent after the Second World War. It has not been a linear process, rather one 
marked by compromises and a constant search for consensus. The EU has emerged 
“as a treaty-based organization founded on the rule of law” (Hill & Smith 2005:98).  
     Following the successful completion of the internal market, the Union 
increasingly turned its attention to global issues, and the sheer economic power of 
the bloc has paved the way for a much more ambitious agenda, that of creating a 
common foreign policy. The Union’s interests in the world have been defined and 
are commensurate with its traditions, norms, values, and mission (:95).  
     The EU presents an ambiguous face to the outside world and many believes the 
CFSP is “the sole expression of the Union’s external persona” (:94). The aspects of 
the EU’s external relations are present within all the three pillars, and in that respect 
the CFSP can be said to be of relatively minor significance: The EC pillar has far 
more substance and commands more influence. Nevertheless, whatever actual status 
the CFSP has, its founding illustrates the general belief among European leaders 
that they need to stick together if they want to attain power and to exert 
international influence (:94-95). However, a key point is the concept of coherence 
and consistency, which is crucial for the EU to be able to project its power onto 
global affairs, not least in order to solve conflicts. In some scholars’ views, the 
institutional problems are largely a symptom of more fundamental issues: 
“Uncertainty about the need for a common security and foreign policy, a lack of 
political will, divergent interests”, and “disagreement over policy” (Sweet, 
Sandholz & Fligsten 2001:192). What is encouraging, however, is the widely 
acknowledged view that turning back is not an option, despite the difficulties 
involved in creating coherent common policies.  
     Many scholars stress the Union’s lack of military power (Missiroli. European 
Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001:331), but judging from its size in manpower 
(1.9 million soldiers) and military spending (surpassing both China, Japan and 
Russia combined) the Union still constitutes an important military force in 
international relations. Compared to the US, the EU is a pygmy, yes, but on the 
other hand, it has different objectives and other means to achieve its aims. The 
Union and its Member States send ten times as many peacekeeping soldiers to 
missions in Africa, Central Asia, and even Central America, than does the United 
States. Furthermore, EU diplomats strive to reconcile apparently unattainable 
conflicts in the Middle East or on the Korean peninsula using diplomacy and ‘soft 
power’ rather than military means (Reid 2004:183; 244; Gnesotto ed. 2004:252).  
     The Union may not be able to solve or prevent a conflict everywhere, as that 
undertaking would most probably outstretch its scarce manpower resources - it is 
the ability to prioritize and discriminate between different issues that matter. In that 
respect, it is essential that the EU does not allow itself to be carried away by its own 
rhetoric, but instead focuses on what it can actually achieve (Hill. European 
Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001:333). The institutional flaws need to be 
corrected, as the TECE was intended to do, but in the absence of any binding treaty, 
the coherence and consistency in the cooperation between the different institutions 
require streamlining and enhancement. Furthermore, in the field, the Union needs 
“to ensure synergy between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management” 
(:193; 196).  
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4. The EU on the Ground: On Mission in the DRC  
 
4.1 Introduction: The Plight of an African Nation 
 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a legacy of violence, suffering, 
exploitation, and external abuse. The bloody conflicts which have plagued the 
country since the end of the 19th century have yet to be solved, and it has been 
dubbed “the messiest and bloodiest conflict in the world” (Bet-El, European Voice: 
2006-07-27). In a decade of warfare, up to 3.8 million people have died and nearly 
four million people displaced. Yet the conflict is hitherto a neglected and 
underreported issue in world politics (Beatty, European Voice: 2005-01-27).  
     In 1885, the area that now comprises the DRC was proclaimed a personal colony 
of the Belgian King Leopold II, the only colony in history to be claimed by one man 
alone. The King exploited the colony in a ruthless and cruel manner, forcing 
Congolese men and women into slavery in the pursuit of the Congo’s riches.  
It has been established that over ten million people lost their lives because of the 
King’s brutal management of his private possession; Leopold II has been described 
as “a man filled with greed and cunning, duplicity and charm…” (Van 
Woudenberg, 2006). Due to a few courageous reporters and witnesses to the 
atrocities, who retold the stories to the world, the King eventually was forced to 
cede his authority over the colony to the Belgian state. The Belgians in turn ruled 
Congo for a mere half a century, but relinquished the colony in 1960, whereby the 
Congolese people gained its independence and the DRC was born.  
     Democratic elections were subsequently held for the first time, which brought 
Patrice Lumumba to power. A fierce anti-colonialist and a supporter of African 
nationalism, Lumumba was revered among the Congolese, but his connections with 
the Soviet Union were ultimately to seal his faith: Belgian agents, with the 
complicity of the US government, murdered him brutally that same year (ibid.).  
     Thus ended the democratic experiment in the DRC, and paved the way for a 
former sergeant in the colonial army, Mobutu, to seize power in a coup d’ètat, 
supported by the US, France and Belgium; these powers were to intervene 
whenever Mobutu’s position was in danger. Mobutu’s subsequent crackdown on 
democracy created a dictatorship in which he was supreme ruler, backed up by the 
army. Largely due to the worlds guilty conscience following the genocide in 
Rwanda, Western powers abandoned Mobutu in 1996 - as a result, he was 
defenceless, and assailed by enemies was forced to flee the country (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2004:7-8). Laurent Kabila, an insignificant rebel leader, seized power with 
the help from Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila was not to renew the democratic 
experiment, however, but instead entrenched and strengthened the corrupt legacy of 
Mobutu and Leopold II before him. Wishing to rid himself of his Rwandan 
supporters, Kabila initiated a campaign of ethnic hatred directed against groups 
linked to Rwanda. The invaders, in turn, did not want to lose their foothold in the 
mineral-wealthy country, and fell upon Kabila’s army in 1998; the ‘first Congo 
war’ drew in additional African countries on different sides, eager to collect the 
spoils (Van Woudenberg, Human Rights Watch: 2006).  
     The ‘UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, which conducted 
research in the area,  concluded that the DRC had been exploited and pillaged of 
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natural resources by all the parties involved in the fighting. The conflict attracted 
criminal networks, mercenaries, and multinational companies from all over the 
world; 35 of the MNCs were European and eight were American (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2004:16-17). A Congolese parliamentary report issued that same year 
stated that the European and US companies had “breached international business 
norms in their operations in Congo” (Van Woudenberg, Human Rights Watch: 
2006); what the parliament had established was uncomfortable for the UN Security 
Council, whose members were “reluctant to punish or even seriously investigate 
corporations based in their own countries” (ibid.). The international community has 
since acknowledged that exploitation of natural resources has been a major factor in 
the DRC conflict, but has done little or nothing about it (ibid.).  
     In 2001, Kabila was assassinated by his own bodyguard, and his son, Joseph, 
succeeded him. The violent end to yet another of Congo’s leaders provided 
opportunities, however, and a transitional government was established consisting of 
leaders from the four main rebel groups (ibid.). When the war ended, at least 
officially, the parties signed the Lusaka Agreement, by many viewed as flawed and 
insufficient: Allegedly, the agreement fails to acknowledge the actors’ 
responsibilities for the war and Congolese rebel groups are defined as interlocuteurs 
valuables (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004:18).  
     The ‘peace’ that resulted from the accord has nonetheless been found wanted: 
Since 1998, 3.9 million people have died from war-related causes, described as “a 
lethal combination of disease and hunger caused by ongoing conflict and 
displacement” (Reuters AlertNet: 2007-03-26). The UN Undersecretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, underscored the point: “There are few places on 
earth were the gap between humanitarian needs and available resources is as large – 
or as lethal – as in Congo” (ibid.). Despite the elections held last year, by many 
hailed as a success, the current situation in the DRC is not enviable. In a report 
issued to the UN Security Council, Global Witness (2004) concludes that the 
country is “fragmented” and “extremely fragile”, a result of “one of the most 
devastating conflicts the world has ever seen” (Global Witness: 2004). Congo's frail 
government is now faced with the unpleasant task of stitching the nation back 
together, as if it ever has existed at all (International Herald Tribune, March 27, 
2007).  
 
 
4.2 EU Operations and Activities in the DRC 
 
 
Given the harsh conditions and circumstances that distinguish the DRC, it is no 
surprise that the UN has its biggest force posted there, the MONUC. The contingent 
comprises around 17000 men, and with a budget of one billion dollars, it is the 
UN’s largest and most expensive mission to date. MONUC’s mandate centers 
around four phases: The first phase entailed ‘peace enforcement’, i.e. “forcibly 
implementing the cease-fire agreement” (The MONUC Website: 2007); phase two 
involved monitoring the ceasefire; phase three, which still cannot be considered 
completed, is centered on the so called ‘DDRRR’ (disarmament, demobilization, 
repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration); phase four involved facilitating the 
transition towards “credible elections” (ibid.). The MONUC force has a mandate to 
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“use all means necessary…to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence…and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions” (ibid.)  
     The EU military forces deployed in the DRC operate under UN auspices, and, 
thus, under the same mandate, chapter VII in the UN Charter (The Council of the 
European Union, Press Document: 2007-04-26) under the Security Council 
Resolutions 1484 and 1671 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007-04-26; 
The Council of the European Union, Press Document: 2007-04-26). The EU has 
engaged troops in two different operations, Artemis (launched 12 June 2003) and 
EUFOR RDCongo (launched 25 April 2006), following the adoption of Common 
Positions and Joint Actions by the Council. In addition, the EU has sent civilian 
missions to the DRC: A police mission, EUPOL-KINSHASA (launched 12 April 
2005); and the EUSEC DRC, a mission to “provide advice and assistance for 
security sector reform” in the DRC (ibid.).  
     Why, then, did the EU intervene in the DRC, considering the small scope of the 
mission, the risks and dangers involved, and the large costs of the operation? The 
EU has explicitly stated that it has an interest in the security in its near geographic 
vicinity, as was the case when the Union took responsibility of the peacekeeping 
missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM). However, in the DRC the notion of intervention due to geographical 
vicinity can be ruled out, and the incentives for EU action questionable. Some 
possible reasons for the Union to meddle in the chaotic affairs of the DRC could 
arguably be the concept of human security, i.e. the idea that a safe and secure Africa 
is crucial for the safety of the EU itself. The weak and frail states of Sub-Saharan 
Africa can be, and perhaps are, ‘safe havens’ for organized crime, illegal trafficking 
of natural resources and arms, as well as breeding grounds for terrorism. One can 
also argue that the involvement in the DRC is part of the Union’s support and 
endorsement of regional organizations and initiatives, not least the African Union 
(AU) (Remacle 2006:2-3).  
 
 
4.2.2 Operation Artemis   
 
 
The operation named Artemis was launched by the ESDP (European Security and 
Defense Policy) under the auspices of the UN in 2003, following a request from the 
UN. It was, according to Kaldor (2004), “a new type of operation, quite different 
from classic military interventions in Africa, whether by United Nations 
peacekeepers or by postcolonial powers…” (Kaldor, International Herald Tribune: 
2004-09-30). The immediate background to the military effort was unrest in the 
Ituri region in the northeast of the DRC, a scene of ethnic fighting and instability 
since May that same year. Given the intense fighting, fear spread that the unrest 
would wreck the ceasefire and destabilize the entire region; Ituri had previously 
seen some of the worst fighting in the whole of the DRC, resulting in 50 000 dead 
and 500 000 displaced persons (Gnesotto et al., 2004:119).  
     The sheer size of the country together with “the width of [the DRC’s] internal 
problems” (Remacle 2005:2) meant that an operation would entail considerable 
uncertainties and risk-taking (ibid.). As such, the operation provided an opportunity 
for the Union to test its military capabilities outside Europe (and without NATO 
support) for the first time. The force consisted of 2000 soldiers under French 
command and of which the main bulk, 1700 troops, were French. Sweden was the 
 23 
 
second largest contributor with 70 soldiers, but apart from the provisions of three 
non-European countries (Brazil, Canada and South Africa), the other EU countries’ 
involvement varied from small contingents of troops (Germany and Greece); airlifts 
and logistic assistance (the UK); to medical aid (Belgium). The objectives of the 
Artemis force were to “stabilize security conditions and improve the humanitarian 
conditions in [the Ituri capital of] Bunia”, to “protect refugee camps…and ensure 
the safety of civilians, UN staff and humanitarian workers” (Gnesotto et al. 
2004:120).  
      
A Wide Range of Challenges 
Overall, from a military point of view, Artemis was a small-scale operation, 
intended to secure specific targets and safeguard civilians until the UN had 
mustered a larger force. The operation officially ended in September 2003, when 
the EU transferred responsibility back to the MONUC force, which had achieved a 
“wider mandate… robust rules of engagement and a larger force” (ibid.).  
     Nonetheless, Artemis involved a myriad of logistical, operational, planning, and 
financial problems, not least the challenge of transporting 2000 troops some 6500 
km from Brussels. In the area of communications, the problem was alleviated by the 
fact that the main part of the contingent was French, and hence did not have to rely 
on ‘foreign’ material standards. Lindstrom (in Gnesotto et al., 2004), however, 
stresses the lack of safe communications capabilities in EU operations, and 
underlines the importance of adequate communicational capacities: Even though 
Artemis steered clear of serious errors, what would happen if 15 or 20 more EU 
countries were involved? In addition, the environment in question can without 
doubt be described as “non-permissive”, which places a heavy burden on the ability 
to sustain the force; as Lindstrom argues, this was a principal reason why Artemis’ 
duration was short and its scope limited. Sustainability encompasses a wide range 
of dimensions, from water supply to “adequate force protection capabilities” (:123-
24). The most critical phase prior to an operation is the planning phase, which 
comprise not only the HQ, but which also have a number of dimensions critical for 
the success of the operation. In order to conduct a satisfactory mission a few 
requirements have to be met, not least the preparatory work in areas such as mission 
objectives, financial planning, ‘procurement’ (i.e. the allocation of resources), 
cooperation with third countries, and ‘contingency planning’ (i.e. an ‘emergency 
plan’). When it comes to these areas, a number of weaknesses are discernible on 
part of the EU operations. Lindstrom points out some deficiencies and 
insufficiencies, not least regarding Artemis: At first, delays, procurement difficulties 
– that is, the lack of equipment and infrastructure - , and planning gaps hampered to 
a not insignificant degree the efficiency of the operation. Furthermore, “limited 
personnel resources, lack of specialised expertise” and the shortness of “sufficient 
backup and support” added further thresholds (:127). To recapitulate, one must yet 
again emphasise that, being a largely ‘French mission’, the worst obstructions and 
impediments could be avoided. However, when faced with a larger mission, and 
with more EU Member States involved, the outcome could be another. Moreover, 
as Remacle reflects, in Artemis the “national efforts” competed with “those of the 
EU”: Fearing the loss of national sovereignty, the Member States were in fact 
obstacles to an efficiently conducted operation. In addition, the not irrelevant 
material difficulties - that is, the problem of working with the different military 
material from the Member States effectively - should be stressed (Remacle 
2006:14).   
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4.2.3 EUFOR RD Congo 
 
 
The year 2006 saw the first democratic elections in the DRC in 40 years, in the 
midst of instability and continued fighting between various militant contingents.  
It can be safe to say that the conditions were not amicable for elections (Beatty, 
European Voice: 2006-07-27), in spite of the fact that MONUC had managed to 
reinforce “considerably in both quantitative and qualitative” terms (Remacle 
2006:10). EUFOR-RDCongo was intended, like Artemis, to support MONUC 
trough the perilous journey from Election Day to that the results had been accepted 
and stability reinstated. Contrasting with Artemis, the EU Member States were 
initially reluctant to contribute troops to EUFOR after the Council had decided on a 
joint action. Germany, though apparently unwilling, decided to lead the 2000 strong 
force with French support and “a rag-bag of troops from…20 European nations” 
(Bet-El, European Voice: 2006-01-25). Purportedly, the contributing countries 
“placed many caveats” on the EUFOR operation: Consequently, the main bulk of 
the force was posted in the neighbour country of Gabon, and the remainder 
stationed in the capital “effectively barred from moving outside Kinshasa” (ibid.). 
This proved “a major drawback” when considering the DRC is three times the size 
of France, with remnants of militias and rebels scattered all over the country (ibid.).  
     For the Union, a lot depended on the operation, as it was viewed as a “key test” 
of its defence and security policy and as crucial for its future involvements around 
the globe. The significance of the mission was apparent, since the EU for the first 
time had employed all of its humanitarian, military and political instruments outside 
Europe. Moreover, since the Union had financed almost 80% of the election costs, 
trained (and is training) Congolese judges and police, as well as the military 
contributions to the peacekeeping force, it was indeed a matter of prestige (Beatty, 
European Voice: 2006-07-27).  
     EUFOR had its flaws and it cannot be said to be a perfectly conducted operation, 
but the UN was supposedly satisfied with the EU contribution, as it contributed to 
heightened international awareness of the crisis in the DRC. According to Bet-El (in 
European Voice: 2006-01-25), “EUFOR was not an impressive exercise”, however, 
“and the EU has a lot to learn from it” (ibid.). Especially blatant was the Member 
States’ unwillingness to partake and the “many caveats”, which illustrate “an 
example of sloppy politics and unprofessional implementation” (ibid.). “But 
perhaps”, Bet-El adds, “it is fitting for an organization unwilling to take up its role 
on the world stage” (ibid.).  It is conceivably fitting as well, that the Polish Defence 
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski saw the job as done: “We are completing the mission 
after successfully executing it.” (Beatty, European Voice: 2006-11-16).  
     Haine and Giegerich (in International Herald Tribune: 2006-06-12) argued that 
EUFOR was in fact a “cosmetic” operation, “more about European form than 
African substance, comforting rhetoric rather than relevant action” (Haines & 
Giegerich, International Herald Tribune: 2006-06-12). The mission’s guiding 
principle, accordingly, was more about “French-German cohesion” and the Union’s 
wish to boost the ESDP’s credibility after the failure of the rejected TECE; the 
realities on the ground in the DRC was “only a secondary factor” (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the mission did not demonstrate the EU’s “willingness to become a 
relevant peacekeeper”, but instead underlined the Union’s “current incapacity to be 
a strategic actor”; especially the long time it took to get the mission off the ground 
is compelling evidence of existing inadequacies (ibid.).  
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4.2.4 EU CCM: EUPOL-Kinshasa and EUSEC-RDCongo  
 
 
The ‘civilian’ dimension of the EU’s operations is a result of the Union’s desire to 
“project stability and lasting peace not only within but also beyond its borders” 
(Nowak 2006:9). The EU’s presence has been felt not only in the Balkans, carrying 
out peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and FYROM, but also in the DRC, 
commencing in 2003. For quiet obvious reasons, the Union can be said to possess 
unique experience of a wide array of policies and programmes “oriented at stability 
projection” as well as the “expertise” needed (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is clear that 
peacebuilding abroad constitute an immensely challenging task for the Union, 
which has to do with the changing nature of conflict (see the chapter on 
“Peacebuilding”) after the Cold War, not least experienced in the Balkans during 
the 1990s. As have been mentioned earlier in this paper, it was the development in 
former Yugoslavia that paved the way for a European ‘crisis response capacity’, as 
well as the “political commitment to prevent violent conflicts” (ibid.).  
     This arduous undertaking represents a massive challenge to the Union, as the 
‘projection of lasting peace and stability’ requires not only that the EU deploys a 
wide range of instruments and tools in a coherent and concerted way, but also that 
the instruments and tools amount to an “appropriate mix” and are deployed aptly to 
be able to “address pre-crisis, active crisis and post-crisis situations” (ibid.).                           
The Union has, in line with the ‘post-modern’ peacebuilding literature, 
acknowledged that the notion of ‘safety’ entails more than military force and the 
capacity to check violence. In the words of Remacle, the EU “seek to ameliorate 
coordination and coherence” (Remacle 2006:2-4) when using the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
instruments it has at its disposal. The range of the instruments the Union can 
employ “allows it to play a very important role” in the entire cycle of violent 
conflict or crisis: Prior to a crisis, i.e. conflict prevention and mediation; in the 
midst of a crisis, using military force and humanitarian intervention; and in the 
wake of a crisis, making use of its “long experience” in “carrying out development 
projects” and building peace (:2-4) 
     According to the EU, ‘civilian crisis management’ (CCM) is defined as “the 
intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis…with the intention of preventing 
a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution” (Nowak 2006:16). 
Furthermore, peacebuilding is defined as “another means of preventing subsequent 
crises…” (ibid.); according to Nowak (2006), CCM “has no equivalent parallel in 
the lexicons of UN, OSCE or non-European regional organizations” (:17). In the 
broadest sense, CCM denotes all instruments and policies that are not military in 
nature, or all the non-military actions of the EU CCM assigned to handle crises.  
     CCM has four prioritized areas: Police, rule of law, civilian administration (CA), 
and civil protection (CP) (:19). The police section is supposed to be capable of 
“performing executive tasks…to re-establish law and order in non-stabilised 
situations” in a “robust [and] flexible” way (:20). Rule of law implies the 
deployment of specialised personnel such as lawyers, police officers, and prison 
staff to ensure the implementation of “fundamental principles of law”; the EU 
makes a distinction between ‘emergency intervention’ and ‘longer-term actions’ 
(:21). The rule of law section targets malfunctioning legal systems and state 
structures in the recipient country, in order to restore public order and security.  
The CA section covers actions and tasks ranging from ‘registration of property’, 
‘elections and taxation’, ‘social and medical service’, and infrastructure functions. 
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The purpose of CA is to provide a basic form of transitional administration, with the 
intention of transferring these functions back to local actors as soon as possible. 
Another function in the EU CCM is CP, a rather vague concept that aims at 
providing “assistance during and after a crisis”, to cover “the immediate survival 
and protection needs of the affected populations”, and to channel EC/EU 
humanitarian aid to concerned countries (:23). CP is an EC instrument that has at its 
disposal the financial assets of the first pillar.  
     The Union has called for an even more ambitious agenda in terms of CCM 
activities and for the EU to “draw on the full range of its potential resources”, 
which include EC, CFSP/ESDP, and Member States capabilities (:29). It can be 
argued, however, that a broader agenda could further widen the gap between 
capabilities and expectations, as we have seen that the institutional framework is 
somewhat flawed in many aspects (Hill & Smith 2005:171).  
      
EUPOL-Kinshasa 
This police mission was a response to the ‘invitation’ from the Government of the 
DRC, was the first civilian mission of CM in Africa, and conducted within the 
framework of the ESDP. Launched in 2005 after some delay, the operations’ 
mission staff comprised of 29 experts from six EU Member States, Canada and 
Turkey. EUPOL’s initial task consisted in providing support and technical 
assistance to the DRC’s newly founded Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in order for the 
unit to function effectively and in accordance with international police standards, 
practices, and human rights. The IPU was intentionally conceived to be an 
ethnically mixed unit, responsible for the protection and supervision of the 
transition to democracy. In that respect, the European Commission has provided the 
unit with adequate training and equipments. Through theoretical and practical 
exercises the aim was (and is) to strengthen the police force in a number of aspects, 
and to prepare the forces for the then forthcoming election. The UN has recognized 
that “[m]aintenance of order” is “a key element for the success of the electoral 
process” (The Council of the European Union, Press Document: 2006-10).  
     EUPOL was, Remacle argues, an operation of “reasonable size” which had set 
“realistic objectives” (Remacle, 2006:7). The objective was not to come to terms 
with all internal problems and malfunctions, nor to act as a substitute to the 
Congolese police force – but to secure the political transition and “to establish and 
legalize the European presence”, even beyond the timeframe of the elections (ibid.).  
Remacle raise the question of whether EUPOL has reinforced the coherence and 
efficiency of the EU actions, and if the Union has contributed to building a 
“different social order” in the DRC. Regarding the first question, the answer is 
“surely positive”; as regards the second one, the EU can be said to have “mitigated” 
the situation in some sense. Albeit expressing himself somewhat vaguely on the 
matter, Remacle asserts that “the Union has undeniably reinforced the coherence of 
its actions in the DRC and the legality of its presence in the eyes of the local actors” 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the EU’s “important role in the formation and supervision of 
the UPI” has been largely beneficial to the MONUC in its mission (:8). It should be 
added and emphasised, however, that it is complicated to assess the impact of an 
ongoing mission, and that the result of the operation is difficult to measure. 
Remacle nonetheless stresses that the EU engagement offers instruments for a 
“behaviour-change” in the Congolese populations’ minds (ibid.).  
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EUSEC-RDCongo  
The Union’s next CM operation had the aim of “capacity building”, i.e. to provide 
assistance and advice to local leaders, in order to reform the security sector. The 
primary goal was to contribute to the build-up of an integrated Congolese army 
(The Council of the European Union, Press Document: 2006-10), and thus had a 
rather strenuous task lying ahead considering that more than 330 000 militia 
soldiers were dispersed in the vast country at the time. In 2004, Western donors 
gave more than $200 million to Congo in order for the soldiers to disarm with the 
relatively modest sum of $25 a month and job training – but the money ran out last 
summer after having helped only a handful of the militiamen. Corruption and 
neglect has persisted despite the relative ‘success’ of last year’s elections, and the 
task of creating a credible force out of rivalling ethnic groups seem insurmountable 
(International Herald Tribune: 2007-03-28).  
     EUSEC purportedly represents the EU’s “ongoing commitment” concerning the 
“DRC transition process”: The mission is to end in June this year and thus is part of 
an assumed ‘medium-term’ involvement. Eight experts together with the Member 
States and the Union institutions were and are to provide advice and assistance to 
the Congolese authorities that are responsible for security, while at the same time 
making sure that the promoted policies are attuned to “human rights and 
international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public 
management, transparency”, and “observance of the rule of law” (EU Council 
Secretariat, Press Release: 2005-05-23). The EU has repeatedly stated that its 
engagement in the DRC’s political transition process is ongoing and continuous, 
and that it is to support the process on an economic, political, and security level 
(ibid.).  
     Entailed in the task of creating a new, fully integrated Congolese army is the 
challenge of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), which 
constitutes prerequisites and are essential for the control of violence. The problem 
of ensuring the safe return to civil life for hundreds of thousands of fighters is one 
of financing, however, as well as to maintain attention to the issue at hand. 
Institutions as the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the European 
Commission are attentive and focused on the challenges of DDR, but often that 
attention diminishes when former fighters of various militia and rebel groups are to 
be integrated into new security organs (Terrie, European Voice: 2005-01-27).  
     Congo’s security problems are of an enormous width, however, and the 
challenges require enhanced coordination of efforts and coherence in the execution 
of these. So far, the European initiatives in the country have been mainly bilateral, 
as for example the agreement between Belgium and South Africa to join efforts to 
train the new army – this right alongside the present EUSEC initiative - or the 
French and UN operations to train the Congolese police. “[The European] 
contributions to peace and security…in Africa are significant”, Terrie  an analyst at 
the International Crisis Group (in European Voice: 2005-01-27) argues, but “the 
EU still has a long way to go before its ability to respond to Africa’s crises matches 
Europe’s size and potential” (ibid.). When national efforts compete with those of 
the Union, the coordination and coherence when conducting joint operations are at 
risk, as well as the EU’s legitimacy and prestige in the region (Remacle 2006:14).  
     As sincere and benevolent the Union’s efforts have been to rebuild a national 
DRC army, the task amounts to a huge challenge. “Our national army is a joke”, 
Tegera, the manager of an aid organization in Goma, said. ''It's a serious 
problem…We’re building on sand.” (Gettleman, NY Times: 2007-03-28).  
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4.3 Conclusion  
 
 
The impact that the EU’s operations and peacebuilding measures in the DRC has 
generated is difficult to assess, given that many operations are short-, medium-, or 
long-term processes in a continuous commitment. Artemis has received much praise 
as supposedly “provided much needed breathing space for the [UN]” and because it 
by all accounts “saved many lives in the country” (Terrie, European Voice: 2005-
01-27). The second military mission to the DRC, EUFOR, did not fare that well 
according to analysts and researchers. EUFOR has been criticized for delays, lack 
of coordination, political will and national caveats. According to Haine and 
Giegerich, it was in fact “a cosmetic operation” which “demonstrates how far away 
the EU is from effectively fulfilling its international responsibilities” (Haines & 
Giegerich, International Herald Tribune: 2006-06-12).  
     Given the small size and timeframe of the above military missions, it could be 
argued that the DRC has actually constituted a “laboratory” for the ESDP as well as 
the CFSP in its ambition to ‘test’ the EU’s capacity for short-term peace enforcing 
operations in a region which has all the typical, cumbersome challenges of a post-
modern conflict (Remacle, 2006:13).  
     The Union has, through its CM and CCM activities EUPOL and EUSEC, 
stepped up its engagement in CP and post-conflict support in the DRC, but 
according to some analysts, the question of enhanced coherence and “effective 
action” remains (Terrie, European Voice: 2005-01-27). While these activities 
hitherto have been implemented in a satisfying manner, they are long-term activities 
that involve a great many risks. It needs to be emphasised that the enormous scale 
of security challenges in the DRC call for enhanced coordination of efforts (ibid.).              
The EU’s focus on public-order institutions - i.e. the particular attention given to the 
IPU and the judiciary – is a necessary step in the right direction as it, if the 
institutions are considered legitimate, can “mitigate conflicts and grievances” 
(Berdal 1996:75). As mentioned earlier in this paper, a lot depends on the world 
community’s political will as to finance the creation of a unified national army, a 
credible, legitimate police force, and to finance the reintegration of former soldiers 
into civilian life. The question is if the UN and the EU are motivated to stay the 
course out, a precondition for a successful peacebuilding operation.  
     This chapter has revealed some obstacles to a coordinated and coherent EU 
peacebuilding effort, for example the reluctance on part of some Member States’ to 
partake in EU military and CCM operations and some Member’s propensity to 
conduct missions and operations bilaterally. The EU need to make every effort to 
coordinate its activities more effectively, and in so doing synchronise the concerned 
institutions’ different objectives and goals.  
     The Community’s development programs are extensive, but nonetheless 
inconclusive as it “encourages [the DRC] to integrate into the world market” 
without taking heed to the effects these policies have on the local economies 
(Schmidt, European Voice: 2005-01-27). The EC aid is channelled through the 
European Development Fund (EDF), but little of it is spent on basic facilities 
(ibid.). The notion of peacebuilding entails supportive action and assistance to help 
the recipient country help itself and to build credible and durable institutions that 
can create a sustainable development. In that sense, it can be devastating for a 
country emerging from a civil war to apply macroeconomic reforms to an economy 
crippled and distorted from years of warfare (Jeong 2005:153).  
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5. Final Comments  
 
 
The aim of this paper has been to relate the scholarly opinions and views on 
peacebuilding to the EU’s ambition and efforts to contribute to crisis management 
and building peace around the world. The paper has discussed and sought to 
conceptualize peacebuilding theory in order to bring a measure of clarity to the 
ongoing debate, and to shed some light on the actual purpose of peacebuilding.  
     To recapitulate, the above reading has shown that a degree of consensus exists 
on the dimensions and essence of peacebuilding.  The difficulties to point out any 
‘mandatory’ features and tools deemed as essential for creating peace 
notwithstanding, scholars seem to agree that peacebuilding is a long-term 
engagement and should not be confined to a certain phase of the conflict. Focusing 
on and addressing root causes is imperative if the conflict is to have any chance of 
being solved, and the peacebuilders – politicians, NGOs, IOs, peacekeepers etc – 
have to be attentive to the long-term economic and socio-political development. 
These have to acknowledge that fostering peaceful relationships and reconciliation 
is an ongoing commitment; alas, the world have seen to many examples where the 
third party has run dry of political will and devotion, not least the crucial funding of 
and assistance to peacebuilding in crisis-and conflict zones. Political will remains 
the supreme prerequisite when it comes to aiding countries ablaze through war and 
suffering.  
     To aid efficiently and contribute to the creation of durable peace and stability in 
a country, there is a need for concerted efforts, a coherent peace plan, and an 
effective implementation of the plan. Peacebuilding must be about addressing the 
structural issues and the long-term relationships between the conflicting parties, 
trough a varying range of tools in the peacebuilders’ repository.  
     There are, however, some issues left somewhat neglected in the literature 
regarding the ‘means to the end’. Most scholars do not emphasise enough the need 
for a political will, that is, the actual determination and motivation of the politicians 
in third countries, not least the EU. Scholars must highlight the consequences of 
unfinished peacebuilding projects, that is, refugee crises, starvation, instability, 
crime and terrorism.  
     Another case in point is the ‘liberal’ notion of peacebuilding, which entails the 
near forceful integration of the affected country into the world market. This can do 
more harm than good as the ‘economic governance’ programs most often are not 
constructed to promote self-sufficiency and to strengthen the local capacities – the 
recipient country is sure to have far greater chances to build local capacities if they 
can avoid donor-dependency. Furthermore, what is important when planning 
peacebuilding missions is a well-conceived plan for DDR. The disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of former soldiers, guerrilla- and militiamen is a 
key issue that needs to be met and addressed if the peace process is to succeed; one 
need not overemphasise the dangers of unemployed and disillusioned ex-
combatants left untouched. In that respect, it is necessary to boost the commitment 
of ex-combatants -foremost officers- to the peace process. However, the third 
parties must contribute funds to assist financially when the soldiers disband, as 
many examples have shown that these are inclined to take up arms if they are not 
satisfied with the situation - war, for many, is a life-style and a livelihood.  
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The public-order institutions, foremost the police and the judiciary, must be 
adequately trained, and enjoy wide recognition and legitimacy.  
 
The EU’s Role in Peacebuilding Missions  
This paper has emphasised the role of institutions when examining the emergence 
of an EU CFSP, its role, drawbacks and advantages. Institutions do matter, 
especially in EU affairs, as they are the determinants and driving vehicles for 
integration, cooperation and to manage the “enormous interdependence” that ties 
together its members (Peterson & Shackleton 2005:7). Powers are shared in the EU, 
not separated, and the institutional framework is characterized by institutional 
dependency. This paper has presented the view that the Union’s institutional 
structure is a major determinant of the EU’s capacities for conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding, and the analysis of the institutional build-up gives credible evidence 
for this argument. As has been put forward in the readings, the issue is not so much 
one of lack of instruments, but rather in finding the political will to overcome the 
structural thresholds and obstructions that the pillar system entail. It seems justified 
to stress the capabilities-expectations gap which the Union’s ambitious agenda and 
aspirations have given rise to. In order to be able to implement and realize its 
endeavours the EU will need much more effective cross-pillar cooperation than 
what is the case today; currently, decision-making on CFSP issues requires 
consensus across two pillars or more. Competition is still rife within the institutions, 
as they battle for more influence in the processes. It is still not possible to give a 
clear answer as to whom actually ‘speaks for Europe’, since it remains a matter of 
the subject at hand, of which institution’s competences are involved. Given that the 
TECE was rejected, other methods must be applied to enhance the efficiency of EU 
decision-making and policy implementation - explicitly that involves improving the 
coordination between the CFSP, the EC pillar and the Member States. Why 
coordination between Pillars I and II is so critical for a successful CFSP is because 
the actor’s muscle, for the near future, resides within Pillar I. As Bretherton and 
Vogler writes:  
 
“However a more effective articulation between political will and economic presence 
has been slow to materialize in practice… For the Commission it has been a 
‘supreme frustration’ that the full potential of economic presence has not been 
realized.” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:255)  
 
As some observers have noted, the EU’s operations have been hampered to a large 
degree by lack of political will, reluctance to partake (on part of some Member 
States), a propensity to conduct bilateral missions, lack of coordination, and 
national caveats. The slow reaction to the UN’s pleas was not done out of 
negligence or disregard, however, but is more certain a result of the Union’s slow 
decision-making process: Three different decision-making modes are employed, 
three key institutions are involved, and the foreign ministries of the 27 Member 
States. Naturally, it is difficult to reach consensus, and the EU comes of as a slow-
moving decision-maker; “A Maserati with the engine of a lawn mower”, as Delors 
put it (Shackleton & Peterson 2002:227).  
     Because of the EU’s bold rhetoric, but more so due to its sheer economic power 
and influence in world affairs, the Union has been bestowed with great expectations 
in a number of issue areas, not least peacebuilding. However, to contribute to 
peacebuilding missions in face of the seemingly insurmountable violence and 
hostility that characterizes modern warfare, is an arduous task, and requires 
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dedication and staying power. Does the EU have it? The operations and missions 
the Europeans have launched have been fairly well executed, but they have (at least 
militarily) been small in scope and resources, and the CCM missions are too early 
to assess. Nevertheless, the EU has shown in the DRC that it is directing its 
resources at the right institutions, namely the political institutions, the police force, 
and the judiciary. These institutions need to be made legitimate and durable if peace 
is to stabilize. In the DRC, the Union has made a grand commitment to aid the UN 
in the peacebuilding mission, and has stepped up its engagement in the country 
through various CM and CCM activities. The UN purportedly has been satisfied 
with the European efforts despite the criticism for example operation EUFOR 
received. Despite this, observers and scholars have called for improved 
coordination and coherence in the planning and execution of peacebuilding 
missions; some go as far as saying that it “demonstrates how far away the EU is 
from…fulfilling its international responsibilities” (Haines & Giegerich, 
International Herald Tribune: 2006-06-12). Others have argued that the EU 
operations are “fitting for an organization unwilling to take up its role on the world 
stage” (Beatty, European Voice: 2006-11-16).  
     Apart from the formidable task of reforming the pillar structure (a challenge 
which is interrelated with a number of issues, not least integration) the short-term 
crisis response must be made consistent with long-term development assistance. As 
the situation remains today, “the number and scale of ESDP civilian 
actions…remain fairly limited” (Nowak 2006:122); what is more, the challenge of 
promoting “good governance” has been met with “tiny” EC economic assistance.  
     Finally, it is the authors firm belief that the EU has the key to solving intractable 
conflicts, and it lies in the economic area: Were the Union to abolish its customs on 
for Africans invaluable commodities (sugar, coffee, bananas etc), and thus address 
its trade and agricultural policies, that would mean a large step in the right 
direction, towards African and Congolese self-sufficiency.  
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